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Riding E. Rubber FF. Day G. Forster G. The vastly outnumbered North African Axis forces did not capitulate until May Four months earlier, the German Sixth Army had surrendered at Stalingrad, marking the resurgence of the Soviet armies.

One major difference was that almost all Axis prisoners of the Western Allies survived their imprisonment, whereas fewer than one in ten of those taken at Stalingrad returned. By this time, U. Everything from the canned-meat product Spam to Sherman tanks and from aluminum ingots to finished aircraft crossed the oceans to the British Isles, the Soviet Union, the Free French, the Nationalist Chinese, the Fighting Poles, and others.

To this day, Soviets refer to any multidrive truck as a studeborkii, or Studebaker, a result of the tens of thousands of such vehicles shipped to the Soviet Union. Moreover, quantity was not produced at the cost of quality. Although some the Allies might have had reservations in regard to Spam, the army trucks, the boots, the small arms, and the uniforms provided by the United States were unsurpassed.

British soldiers noted with some envy that American enlisted men wore the same type of uniform material as did British officers. After the North African Campaign ended in , the Allies drove the Axis forces from Sicily, and then, in September , they began the interminable Italian Campaign. It is perhaps indicative of the frustrating nature of the war in Italy that the lethargic Allies allowed the campaign to begin with the escape of most Axis forces from Sicily to the Italian peninsula.

The Germans were still better at this sort of thing. German forces in Italy ultimately surrendered in late April , only about a week before Ger- many itself capitulated. No other such powerful army was so completely defeated in so short a period of time. The French air force and navy likewise had some excellent equipment as well as more progressive commanders than the army, but France fell before they could have any great impact on the course of battle.

The Luftwaffe had superbly trained pilots, although their quality fell off drastically as the war turned against their nation. The Luftwaffe also fielded a rocket-powered interceptor, but this craft was as great a menace to its own pilots as to the enemy. Sub- marines were an entirely different matter.

U-boat wolf packs decimated Allied North Atlantic shipping, and the Battle of the Atlantic was the only campaign the eupeptic Churchill claimed cost him sleep.

German U-boats ravaged the Atlantic coast of the United States, even ranging into Chesapeake Bay in the first months of to take advantage of inexcusable American naval unpreparedness. As in World War I, convoy was the answer to the German U-boat, a lesson that had to be learned the hard way in both conflicts.

As with the French, although to a lesser degree, the British feared a repetition of the slaughter experienced on the World War I Western Front, and except for the elite units, they rarely showed much dash or initiative.

The British Expeditionary Force fought well and hard in France in but moved sluggishly thereafter. By far the worst performance of the British army occurred in Malaya-Singapore in the opening months of the war.

For all of their commando tradition, moreover, the British undertook few guerrilla actions in any of their lost colonies. Churchill himself was moved to wonder why the sons of the men who had fought so well in World War I on the Somme, despite heavy losses, suffered so badly by comparison to the Americans still holding out on Bataan. As late as , the Japanese easily repulsed a sluggish British offensive in the Burma Arakan. This situation changed drastically when General William Slim took command of the beaten, depressed Anglo-Indian forces in Burma.

His was the only sizable Allied force not to outnumber the Japanese, yet he inflicted the worst land defeat in its history on Japan and destroyed the Japanese forces in Burma.

Unlike so many Allied generals, Slim led from the front in the worst climate of any battle front. Yet, considering his accomplishments with limited resources and in different conditions, William Slim should be considered the finest ground commander of World War II. He was proved emphatically and fatally wrong when Japanese torpedo- bombers rather swiftly dispatched his Prince of Wales and Repulse on the third day after the opening of war in the Pacific.

The Royal Navy was also handicapped by the fact that not until did it win control of the Fleet Air Arm FAA from the RAF, which had little use for naval aviation and had starved the FAA of funds and attention through the years between the world wars.

Navy envied, albeit at the cost of smaller aircraft capacity, Fleet Air Arm aircraft were so obsolete that the service had to turn to U. Even so, the FAA made history on 11 November when its obsolete Fairy Swordfish torpedo- bombers sank three Italian battleships in Taranto harbor, a feat that the Japanese observed carefully but the Americans did not.

British battleships and carriers kept the vital lifeline through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal open through the darkest days of the war, and together with the Americans and Canadians, they defeated the perilous German submarine menace in the North Atlantic. Significant surface actions of the Royal Navy included the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in May by an armada of British battleships, cruisers, carriers, and warplanes and the December destruction of the pocket battleship Scharnhorst by the modern battleship Duke of York.

The Soviet army almost received its deathblow in the first months of the German invasion. The Red Air Force developed into one of the most effective tactical air powers of the war. The Soviets constructed very few heavy bombers. The Shturmovik was certainly one of the best ground-attack aircraft of the time. The Red Navy, by contrast, apparently did little to affect the course of the war; its main triumph may have been in early when its sub- marines sank several large German passenger ships crammed with refugees from the east in the frigid Baltic, the worst maritime disasters in history.

The United States emerged from World War II as the only nation since the time of the Romans to be a dominant power on both land and sea, not to mention in the air. In , the U. Air Force and Navy could have defeated any combination of enemies, and only the Soviet army could have seri- ously challenged the Americans on land.

Army was about the size of that of Romania; by , it had grown to some 12 million men and women. Eventually, it had the satisfaction of watching the Japanese surrender on board a U.

Navy battleship in that harbor. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, it was obvious that the air- craft carrier was the ideal capital ship for this war, and the United States virtually mass-produced such warships in the Essex-class. The U. Navy had much to learn from its enemy, as demonstrated in the Battle of Savo Island, where Japanese cruisers sank three U. Navy submarines succeeded where the German navy had failed in two world wars, as absolutely unrestricted submarine warfare strangled the Japanese home islands, causing near starvation.

Equally impressive, the U. Navy in the Pacific originated the long- range sea-train, providing American sailors with practically all their needs while they fought thousands of miles from the nearest continental American supply base. Marine Corps was a unique military force.

Alone among the marine units of the belligerents, it had its own air and armor arms under its own tactical control. Marines were the spearhead that stormed the Japanese-held islands of the Pacific, and the dramatic photograph of a small group of Marines raising the American flag over the bitterly contested island of Iwo Jima became an icon of the war for Americans.

The Japanese army was long on courage but shorter on individual initiative. It was a near medieval force, its men often led in wild banzai charges by sword-flourishing officers against machine-gun emplacements. Only two-thirds of Allied troops unfortunate enough to fall into Japanese hands survived to the end of the war.

The Imperial Japanese Navy and the air arms of the army and navy were superb in the early stages of the Pacific war. Both had extensive combat experience in the Chinese war as well as modern equipment.

Japanese admirals were the best in their class between and , and Japanese air and naval forces, along with the Japanese army itself, quickly wound up European colonial pretensions. Only the vast mobilized resources of the United States could turn the tide against Japan. And except for their complete loss of air control, only in Burma were the Japanese outfought on something like equal terms.

All enjoyed peace and the absence of major war. Even for the Soviets, the postwar decades were infinitely better than the prewar years, although much of this measure of good fortune might be attributed simply to the death of Josef Stalin.

Except for Great Britain, the British Commonwealth nations and even more so the United States emerged from the war far stronger than when they entered it after enduring a decade of the Great Depression. By the s, both war-shattered Western Europe and Japan were well on their way to becoming major competitors of the United States.

The uniquely sagacious and foresighted Western Allied military occupations of Germany, Japan, and Austria in many ways laid the foundations for the postwar prosperity of these former enemy nations. For the most part, similar good fortune bypassed the less developed nations.

In it, the German navy tried to sever the Allied sea lines of communication along which supplies necessary to fight the war were sent to Great Britain. To carry out the battle, the Germans employed a few surface raiders, but principally they used U-boats. Although an extensive building program was immediately begun, only in the second half of did U-boat numbers begin to rise.

On the Allied side, British navy leaders were at first confident that their ASDIC for Allied Submarine Detection Investigating Committee location device would enable their escort vessels to defend the supply convoys against the sub- merged attackers, so that shipping losses might be limited until the building of new merchant ships by Britain, Canada, and the United States might settle the balance. It took time, however, before the battles of the convoys really began.

The Battle of the Atlantic became a running match between numbers of German U-boats and the development of their weapons against the Allied merchant ships, their sea and air escorts with improving detection equipment , and new weapons. The Battle of the Atlantic may be subdivided into eight phases. During the first of these, from September to June , a small number of U-boats, seldom more than 10 at a time, made individual cruises west of the British Isles and into the Bay of Biscay to intercept Allied merchant ships.

Generally, these operated independently because the convoy system, which the British Admiralty had planned before the war, was slow to take shape.

Thus the U-boats found targets, attacking at first according to prize rules by identifying the ship and providing for the safety of its crew. However, when Britain armed its merchant ships, increasingly the German submarines struck without warning.

The results confirmed the possibility of vectoring a group of U- boats to a convoy by radio signals from whichever U-boat first sighted the convoy. However, at this time, the insufficient numbers of U-boats available and frequent torpedo failures prevented real successes. The German conquest of Norway and western France provided the U-boats with new bases much closer to the main operational area off the Western Approaches and brought about a second phase from July to May In this phase, the U-boats, operated in groups or wolf packs, were directed by radio signals from the shore against the convoys, in which was now concentrated most of the maritime traffic to and from Great Britain.

Even if the number of U-boats in the operational area still did not rise to more than 10 at a time, a peak of efficacy was attained in terms of the relationship between tonnage sunk and U-boat days at sea. This was made possible partly by the weakness of the convoy escort groups because the Royal Navy held back destroyers to guard against an expected German invasion of Britain.

In addition, British merchant shipping losses were greatly augmented during this phase by the operations of German surface warships in the north and central Atlantic; by armed merchant raiders in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans; by the attacks Aluminum Boats Halifax 30 of German long-range bombers against the Western Approaches; and by heavy German air attacks against British harbors.

The Ger- mans were also aided by Italian submarines based at Bordeaux and sent into the Atlantic, the numbers of which in early actually surpassed the number of German U-boats. In late and spring , when the danger of an inva- sion of the British Isles had receded, London released destroyers for antisubmarine operations and redeployed Coastal Command aircraft to support the convoys off the Western Approaches.

Thus, in the third phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, from May to December , the U-boats were forced to operate at greater distances from shore. Long lines of U-boats patrolled across the convoy routes in an effort to intercept supply ships. This in turn forced the British in June to begin escorting their convoys along the whole route from Newfoundland to the Western Approaches and�when the U-boats began to cruise off West Africa�the route from Freetown Aluminum Boats Halifax 643 to Gibraltar and the United Kingdom as well.

In March , the Allies captured cipher materials from a German patrol vessel. Settings secured from this encoding machine enabled the Royal Navy to read June U-boat radio traffic practically currently.

On 9 May during a convoy battle, the British destroyer Bull- dog captured the German submarine U and secured the settings for the high-grade officer-only German naval signals.

This led to interception of German supply ships in the Atlantic and cessation of German surface ship operations in the Atlantic. Beginning in August , BP operatives could decrypt signals between the commander of U-boats and his U-boats at sea. The Allies were thus able to reroute convoys and save perhaps 1. During this third phase, the U. Atlantic Fleet was first involved in the battle. The entry of the United States into the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ushered in the fourth phase of the battle, presenting the U-boats with a second golden opportunity from January to July Attacking unescorted individual ships off the U.

East Coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean, German U-boats sank greater tonnages than during any other period of the war. But sightings and sinkings off the U. Thus, in July , he switched the U-boats back to the North Atlantic con- voy route. This began the fifth phase, which lasted until May Now came the decisive period of the conflict between the U-boat groups and the convoys with their sea and air escorts. Increasingly, the battle was influenced by technical innovations.

Most important in this regard were efforts on both sides in the field of signals intelligence. On 1 February , the Germans had introduced their new M-4 cipher machine, leading to a blackout in decryption that lasted until the end of December This accomplishment was of limited influence during the fourth phase, because the German U-boats operated individually according to their given orders, and there was no great signal traffic in the operational areas.

And when the convoy battles began again, the Germans could at first decrypt Allied convoy signals. But when Bletchley Park was able to decrypt German signals anew, rerouting of the convoys again became possible, although this was at first limited by rising numbers of German U-boats in patrol lines.

Now Allied decryption allowed the dispatch of additional surface and air escorts to support threatened convoys. This development, in connection with the introduction of new weapons and high-frequency direction finding, led to the collapse of the U-boat offensive against the convoys only eight weeks later, in May Allied success in this regard could be attributed mainly to the provision of centimetric radar equipment for the sea and air escorts and the closing of the air gap in the North Atlantic.

In a sixth intermediate phase from June to August , the U-boats were sent to distant areas where the antisubmarine forces were weak, while the Allied air forces tried to block the U-boat transit routes across the Bay of Biscay.

The change to a new Allied convoy cipher in June, which the German decryption service could not break, made it more difficult for the U-boats to locate the convoys in what was the seventh phase from September to June During this time, the German U-boat command tried to deploy new weapons acoustic torpedoes and increased antiaircraft armament and new equipment radar warning sets to force again a decision with the convoys, first in the North Atlantic and then on the Gibraltar routes.

After short-lived success, these operations failed and tapered off as the Germans tried to pin down Allied forces until new, revolutionary U-boat types became available for operational deployment. The final, eighth phase, from June to May , began with the Allied invasion of Normandy. But construction of the new U-boats of which the Allies received information by decrypting reports sent to Tokyo by the Japanese embassy in Berlin was delayed by the Allied bombing offensive, and the German land defenses collapsed before sufficient numbers of these boats were ready.

The Battle of the Atlantic lasted without interruption for 69 months, during which time German U-boats sank 2, Allied and neutral merchant ships, 2, of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The U-boats also sank many warships, from aircraft carriers to destroyers, frigates, corvettes and other antisubmarine vessels. The Germans lost in turn one large battleship, one pocket battleship, some armed merchant raiders, and U-boats, of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

The Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic resulted from the vastly superior resources on the Allied side in shipbuilding and aircraft production the ability to replace lost ships and aircraft and from superior antisubmarine detection equipment and weapons. Allied signals intelligence was critical to the victory.

Beesly, Patrick. London: Greenhill Books, Blair, Clay. New York: Random House, , Gardner, W. The Critical Convoy Battles of March Runyan, Timothy J. Copes, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Syrett, David. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, Wynn, Kenneth. Vol 1. Career Histories, U1-U; vol. London: Chatham Publishing, , Strategic bombing may generally be defined as air attacks directed at targets or systems capable of having a major impact on the will or ability of an enemy nation to wage war.

Airpower proponents have touted strategic bombing as a unique war-winning capability and have used it to justify independent air services. Although most states with advanced militaries had interest in powerful airpower, continental concerns, resource limitations, or misguided procurement policies hindered most aspirants to powerful long-range bombing forces.

Only relatively protected naval powers such as the United States and Britain could afford to focus so much attention on strategic bombing, lured by the strong political appeal of its promise of quick victory at relatively low cost. Although airmen in both countries became aware of the ideas of Giulio Douhet during the interwar years and used them to support arguments for strategic airpower, Douhet had little impact on the evolution of the RAF or the U.

Army Air Corps. However, targeting priorities remained vague, and the war would soon reveal the large gap between claims and capabilities. Bombing examples before and during the early days of World War II�in Spain and China and even the German Blitz on London�appeared to demonstrate the ineffectiveness and drawbacks of indiscriminate attacks on cities and to support the superiority of precision tactics.

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the army and navy for munitions estimates for a potential war in , many of those ACTS instructors had joined the Air Staff in Washington. They also found it difficult to put theory into practice. Early British attacks moved from a Tivertonian focus on key systems like power plants or oil to a more Trenchardian reliance on widespread morale effects.

Daylight raids proved deadly for RAF Bomber Command, revealing critical deficiencies in the number and quality of their bombers. Operations shifted to the nighttime, but the August Butt Report concluded that only about one in five aircrews were bombing within five miles of their intended targets.

Adapt- ing to the reality of their capabilities, in February Bomber Command was directed to attack area targets�that is, cities�with the objective of undermining German civilian morale, particularly that of industrial workers. However German night defenses also adapted. When Harris decided to mount a full-scale assault on Berlin in late , the Luftwaffe shot down so many British aircraft, and bombing results were so disappointing, that the utility of the whole night area campaign was brought into question.

Meanwhile, the Americans had also encountered difficulties. It was rather poorly coordinated, but it did allow each air force to pursue its preferred approach. Elements of the Eighth Air Force began bombing the continent from England in August , although they did not fly deep penetration raids into central and eastern Germany until a year later.

Although the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy joined the daylight campaign in November , the Americans were unable to sustain such attrition.

By the end of the year, such deep attacks on Germany were suspended, and it appeared that the Luftwaffe was on the verge of winning the strategic air war in Europe. The air battles that ensued decimated the Luftwaffe, and by the time of the D-day landings in June, the Allies achieved air supremacy over France and air superiority over Germany.

The escort fighters began by sticking close to their bombers, but they proved most effective when they were released to sweep against enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. Because of the American adoption of radar- directed bombing methods through overcast skies, the Ger- mans had little respite even in poor weather, and their losses were increased by many accidents. Although the strategic bombers had an initial priority to operations in support of the coming invasion, Allied airpower had built up to the point that USSTAF commander General Carl Spaatz could begin sustained attacks against oil targets in May.

By the fall of , Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht operations were severely crippled by fuel shortages, and concentrated attacks against transportation networks further limited German mobility and economic activity. However, British bombers did sometimes assist with attacks on oil and transportation targets, and their larger loads of bombs could cause considerable damage.

The RAF greatly improved its ability to navigate and bomb at night or in bad weather, and it usually achieved greater accuracy than the Americans under such conditions. Even in clear weather, precision bombing did not approach the image often portrayed in the press of bombs dropping down smokestacks. Usually, all aircraft in the B and B formations dropped their loads together, with intervals set between bombs so they would fall a few hundred feet apart.

The pattern therefore covered a wide area. As USSTAF strength increased and targets became scarcer, planners became more tolerant of civilian casualties, Aluminum Boats Houston Young adopting less accurate radar-directed bombardment methods in bad weather and hitting transportation objectives in city centers.

At least in Europe, American air leaders remained committed to attacks aimed primarily at economic and military targets instead of at civilian morale, a policy that sometimes caused friction with their British allies.

There were also differences over bombing in occupied countries, where the British were particularly sensitive to political repercussions. The Americans were willing to bomb any Axis factory regard- less of the nationality of the workers, whereas the British preferred to strike any German anywhere. The British also favored heavy attacks on the capitals of Axis allies in the Balkans, although the Americans successfully blocked what they saw as an inefficient and ineffective diversion of valuable airpower.

The differing national approaches also played a role as the war in Europe approached its end, and both air forces sought an aerial death blow to finish the war.

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